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I. INTRODUCTION
This Article highlights developments in Illinois labor and em-
ployment law during the Survey year. The Illinois Supreme Court
decided a number of significant cases involving employer criminal
liability,' employee defamation claims,' the burden of proof in dis-
* Of Counsel, Seyfarth, Shaw, Fairweather & Geraldson, B.A., 1970, Northwestern
University; J.D., 1975, Loyola University of Chicago.
** B.S., 1980, Arizona State University; M.B.A., 1982, George Washington Univer-
sity; J.D. candidate, 1990, Loyola University of Chicago.
1. See infra notes 17-43 and accompanying text.
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crimination claims,3 court authority with relation to arbitration4
and joint employer status. 5 The Illinois courts also dealt with dis-
crimination claims,6 mandatory subjects of bargaining,7 the rela-
tionship between grievance-arbitration and the civil service system'
and supplemental pension benefits.9 Additionally, the Illinois leg-
islature modified laws affecting access to personnel files,10, sexual
harassment,"' affirmative action 2 and AIDS testing.' 3 The legisla-
ture enacted several new pieces of legislation pertaining to employ-
ment, including the Employee Rights Violation Act' 4 and the Job
Referral and Job Listing Services Consumer Protection Act.15 Fi-
nally, a new provision in the Workers' Compensation Act creates a
Self-Insurers Administration Fund.' 6
II. EMPLOYER CRIMINAL LIABILITY
Congress adopted the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970 ("OSHA")' 7 to promote safe and healthful working condi-
tions.'" OSHA provides that an employer must comply with the
standards adopted by the Occupational Safety and Health Agency
and other nationally recognized standards."' Under OSHA, if a
state desires authority to regulate health and safety in the work
place, it must first obtain federal approval of its alternative plan.2°
In a decision of national significance, People v. Chicago Magnet
2. See infra notes 44-58 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 59-76, 103-18 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 77-101, 164-183, 184-208 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 119-38 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 139-49 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 150-63 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 175-83 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 184-207 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 208-10 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 211-12 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 213-15 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 217-18 and accompanying text.
14. See infra note 216 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 219-20 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 216-17 and accompanying text.
17. 29 U.S.C. § 651-678 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
18. The Act provides that "Congress declares it to be its purpose and policy ... to
assure so far as possible every working man and woman in the Nation safe and healthful
working conditions and to preserve our human resources ....... 29 U.S.C. § 651(b)
(1982).
19. Id. § 654. The Act also authorizes inspectors to investigate work places. Id.
§ 657. OSHA further provides for civil and criminal penalties based on the seriousness of
the violation and the willfulness of the employer's acts. Id. § 666.
20. The Act provides:
(a) Nothing in this chapter shall prevent any State agency or court from assert-
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Wire Corp. ,2 the Illinois Supreme Court held that OSHA does not
preempt the State of Illinois from criminally prosecuting employ-
ers for conduct that OSHA standards regulate. 22 In Chicago Mag-
net Wire, a manufacturing company's officers and agents were
indicted for knowingly and recklessly causing the injury of forty-
two employees.23 The indictments alleged that these agents and
officers failed to take safety precautions to protect employees from
exposure to toxic substances used by the company in its manufac-
21turing processes.
The defendants moved to dismiss the charges, claiming that
OSHA preempted the State from prosecuting the defendants. 25
The defendants argued that OSHA is the sole mechanism for regu-
lating the conduct that allegedly rendered the company's work
place unsafe. 26 According to the defendants, Illinois did not have
ing jurisdiction under State law over any occupational safety or health issue
with respect to which no standard is in effect under section 655 of this title.
(b) Any State which, at any time, desires to assume responsibility for develop-
ment and enforcement therein of occupational safety and health standards relat-
ing to any occupational safety or health issue with respect to which a Federal
standard has been promulgated under section 655 of this title shall submit a
State plan for the development of such standards and their enforcement.
29 U.S.C. § 667 (a), (b) (1982).
21. 126 Ill. 2d 356, 534 N.E.2d 962, cert. denied sub. nom. Asta v. Illinois, 110 S. Ct.
52 (1989).
22. 126 I11. 2d at 365, 534 N.E.2d at 966.
23. Id. at 359, 534 N.E.2d at 963. The company's principal business was coating wire
with chemical compounds.
24. Id. The charges against the corporation and five of its officers included aggra-
vated battery and reckless conduct. The individual defendants were also charged with
conspiracy to commit aggravated battery.
25. 126 Ill. 2d at 359, 534 N.E.2d at 963. Federal law may preempt action by states
in one of three ways. First, Congress can preempt expressly by stating that any state law
within a given field is superceded by federal law. Second, Congress can impliedly pre-
empt if there is evidence that Congress intended to occupy a given field to the exclusion of
state regulation. Finally, state law is preempted if it conflicts with federal law. See gener-
ally Pacific Gas and Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation and Dev. Comm.,
461 U.S. 190, 203-04 (1983).
26. Chicago Magnet Wire, 126 Ill. 2d at 363, 534 N.E.2d at 965. As authority for
their proposition, the defendants cited a federal regulation promulgated by the Secretary
of Labor that provides:
Section 18(a) of [OSHA] is read as preventing any State agency or court from
asserting jurisdiction under State law over any occupational safety or health
issue to which a Federal standard has been issued.
Id. at 365, 534 N.E. 2d at 965 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1901.2 (1986)).
As further authority, the defendants cited another regulation that provides
[OSHA's preemptive provisions] apply to all state or local laws which relate to
an issue covered by a Federal standard, without regard to whether the state law
would conflict with, complement, or supplement the Federal standard, and
without regard to whether the state law appears to be 'at least as effective as' the
Federal standard.
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authority to prosecute the defendants because Illinois never re-
ceived approval for an alternative regulatory plan. In contrast,
the State contended that OSHA did not preempt state criminal
prosecutions because the OSHA objectives differed from state
criminal law objectives.2 s
On appeal, the Illinois Supreme court reasoned that OSHA
neither explicitly nor implicitly preempted state criminal law.29
According to the court, OSHA did not explicitly preempt criminal
prosecution because the OSHA language never refers to criminal
law. 30  In addition, the court determined that OSHA did not im-
plicitly preempt criminal prosecutions because, although OSHA is
intended to be a comprehensive federal statute, OSHA still leaves a
role for the states.3' Specifically, the court noted that OSHA en-
courages the states to assume responsibility for the administration
and enforcement of their occupational safety and health laws.32
The court determined that the federal interest in regulating
safety matters does not mandate preemption.33 According to the
court, regulation of safety matters historically has been a matter of
state and local concern. 34 Nothing in the structure of OSHA, or its
legislative history, indicates that Congress intended to preempt the
enforcement of state criminal laws which prohibit employer con-
Id. at 365, 534 N.E. 2d at 966 (citing Hazard Communication Standard, 52 Fed. Reg.
31,852, 31,860 (1987)).
27. Id. at 364, 534 N.E.2d at 965.
28. Id. at 366, 534 N.E.2d at 966. The circuit court agreed with the defendants and
dismissed the charges. Id. at 361, 534 N.E.2d at 964. For the same reasons, the appellate
court affirmed. Id. at 359, 534 N.E.2d at 963. The Illinois Supreme Court, however,
reversed the appellate court, concluding that the State could prosecute the defendants.
Id. at 376, 534 N.E.2d at 970.
29. Id. at 367-69, 534 N.E.2d at 966-67.
30. Id. at 364, 534 N.E.2d at 965.
31. Id. at 367-68, 534 N.E.2d at 966-67.
32. Id. at 367-68, 534 N.E.2d at 967. The court noted the overall congressional pur-
pose behind OSHA:
Congress declares it to be its purpose . .. to assure . . . safe and healthful
working conditions.., by encouraging the States to assume the fullest responsi-
bility for the administration and enforcement of their occupational safety and
health laws by providing grants to the States to assist in identifying their needs
and responsibilities in the area of occupational safety and health, to develop
plans in accordance with the provisions of this chapter, to improve the adminis-
tration and enforcement of State occupational safety and health laws, and to
conduct experimental and demonstration projects in connection therewith.
Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 651(b)(11) (1982)).
33. 126 Ill. 2d at 367, 534 N.E.2d at 966.
34. Id. The court noted that federal acts will not supersede state police power absent
a "clear and manifest" congressional purpose. Id. (citing Hillsborough County v. Auto-
mated Medical Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 715 (1985); San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v.
Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 244 (1959)).
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duct that OSHA also regulates.35
The court also reasoned that the OSHA objectives are not the
same as those of state criminal laws. 36 The purpose of OSHA is to
regulate safety in the work place by deterring prohibited conduct. 3
In contrast, state criminal laws regulate safety beyond the work-
place and also serve both a retributive and deterrent function.3
The court indicated that criminal intent must be proven in state
criminal actions but not in actions alleging OSHA violations.3 9
OSHA, therefore, applies merely because there is a violation of an
OSHA standard; the relevant state criminal laws apply only to em-
ployers who recognize or should have recognized that the work-
place poses a risk of injury, but who nevertheless fail to take
preventative precautions.' Lastly, because the OSHA penalties
for death or serious injury to employees are far less severe than
under state criminal laws, a contrary holding would effectively
grant immunity to employers who caused death or serious injury to
employees."
Chicago Magnet Wire is a landmark decision that will have a
powerful impact on state criminal prosecutions across the nation. 2
The decision clears the way for state prosecutors to pursue crimi-
nal convictions as a means to ensure safe workplaces. This in-
creased protection for workers has particular import in an era
35. Id. at 366-67, 534 N.E.2d at 966.
36. Id. at 366, 534 N.E.2d at 966. Arguably, state criminal laws also implicitly sup-
port the purpose of OSHA because OSHA's strict penalties serve as another form of
deterrence.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. Compliance with OSHA standards is mandatory, unless a variation or ex-
emption is obtained from the Secretary of Labor. 29 U.S.C. § 665 (1982). Regardless of
intent, OSHA provides for civil penalties based on the seriousness of the violation. Id.
§ 666. If the employer's actions are "willful," the civil penalties increase and criminal
penalties are mandated. Id.
40. Chicago Magnet Wire, 126 Ill. 2d at 373, 534 N.E.2d at 969.
41. Id. at 370-71, 534 N.E.2d at 968. For example, under OSHA, a willful violation
resulting in death only has a six-month maximum sentence. 29 U.S.C. § 666 (e) (1982).
A second conviction for the same offense has only a maximum jail penalty of one year.
Id. If an employer willfully ignores an OSHA standard and employee deaths result, the
maximum penalty under OSHA is incarceration for one year. The very same deaths
prosecuted under state criminal usually would have much more severe penalties. 126 Ill.
2d at 366, 534 N.E.2d at 966. Accordingly, the court reasoned that the sentences pro-
vided in OSHA should be viewed as a "nationwide floor" for effective safety and health
standards. Id. at 368, 534 N.E.2d at 967 (citing United Airlines v. Occupational Safety
and Health Appeals Bd., 32 Cal. 3d 762, 187 Cal. Rptr. 387, 654 P.2d 157 (1982)).
42. On October 1, 1989, the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari in Chi-
cago Magnet Wire. See supra note 21. Thus, other states may now look to Illinois for
leadership in this area.
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when death and injury rates are up, and federal enforcement is
down.43
III. THE PRIVATE SECTOR
A. Defamation
Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act
("LMRA")" allows an employee covered by a collective bargain-
ing agreement to bring suit in federal district court for a breach of
that contract.4 5 During the Survey year, the Illinois Supreme
Court, in Krasinski v. United Parcel Service, Inc. ," held that sec-
tion 301 of the LMRA does not preempt an employee's state
claim.4 7
In Krasinski, a loss prevention supervisor suspected that an em-
ployee had stolen a saw from a shipment.48 The supervisor and a
manager thereafter publicly accused the employee of the theft, and
the employee was discharged. 49 He then filed suit in the circuit
court, alleging that his employer maliciously defamed him.50 The
43. One report has concluded that 14,000 Americans are killed, and 2.5 million are
permanently injured every year in their workplaces. 116 CONG. REC. 36,512 (1970)
(statement of Sen. Mondale), reprinted in SUBCOMM. ON LABOR OF THE SENATE COMM.
ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE, 92D CONG., IST SESSION, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT OF 1970, at 322 (Comm. Print 1971).
During the Reagan administration, the Justice Department brought only two criminal
indictments under OSHA. Address by New York Attorney General Robert Abrams,
10th Annual Membership Meeting of the New York Committee on Occupational Safety
and Health (November 14, 1989).
44. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § 301, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1982).
45. 29 U.S.C. § 185(a).
46. 124 Ill. 2d 483, 530 N.E.2d 468 (1988).
47. Id. at 490, 530 N.E.2d at 471. To make out a claim for defamation, a plaintiff
must demonstrate that: 1) a defendant made a false statement concerning the plaintiff, 2)
there was unprivileged publication to a third party through fault of defendant, and 3) the
unprivileged publication caused damage to the plaintiff. See, e.g., Reuber v. United
States, 750 F.2d 1039, 1060 n.31 (D.C. Cir. 1984). To make out a claim for malicious
defamation, the employee must prove that the employer made statements with "actual
malice," which requires employees to prove the employer made the statement with reck-
less disregard of its veracity, or with knowledge of its falsity. See e.g., Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
48. Krasinski, 124 Il1. 2d at 486, 530 N.E.2d at 469.
49. Id. The supervisor and the manager confronted the employee when the employee
returned to the office from his route. In front of the manager, the supervisor told the
employee that he had a signed statement from a person who bought the saw from the
employee. The statement supposedly indicated that the employee stole the saw and sold
it knowing that it was "hot." Id. Actually, there was no signed statement. Id.
50. Id. at 485, 530 N.E.2d at 469. The employee also filed an unlawful discharge
action in circuit court, alleging that he was discharged for being an active spokesman of
employee rights. Id. at 487, 530 N.E.2d at 470. The circuit court dismissed the unlawful
discharge count without giving a reason. Id. The court may have dismissed this count
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employer moved to dismiss plaintiff's claim, arguing that it was
preempted by the LMRA and the National Labor Relations Act
("NLRA").5" The circuit court granted the employer's motion to
dismiss on preemption grounds. 2 The appellate court reversed,
holding that malicious defamation is an independent state court
cause of action that is not preempted by federal law.5 3
The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, and held that section 301
of the LMRA did not preempt the malicious defamation count be-
cause it exists independently of the collective bargaining agree-
ment.5 4 The court reasoned there could be no preemption under
the LMRA because the employee's complaint made no reference to
the collective bargaining agreement nor was interpretation of the
collective bargaining agreement necessary to determine if there was
actual malice.5
The court also rejected the employer's argument that the defa-
mation claim was preempted by the NLRA.56 The court stated
that merely because the claim could arguably be characterized as
an unfair labor practice does not mandate preemption in order to
protect the exclusive jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations
Board ("NLRB").57 The right to be free from malicious defama-
tion does not arise out of the rights negotiated in the labor con-
because the employee had arbitrated the discharge under the collective bargaining agree-
ment and the arbitrator had previously ordered the employee's reinstatement. See id. at
487-88, 530 N.E.2d at 470.
51. Id. at 487, 530 N.E.2d at 470 (citing 29 U.S.C. paras. 151-169 (1982 & Supp. V
1987)). Specifically, the employer argued that federal labor law preempted the malicious
defamation claim because it required the court to determine whether the employee was
discharged for "just cause" under the collective bargaining agreement. Id. In 1988, the
Supreme Court, in Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, 486 U.S. 399, on remand 857
F.2d 422 (7th Cir. 1988), held that section 301 of the LMRA did not preempt a union
employee's state retaliatory discharge claim, because the state court was not required to
interpret a just cause provision in a collective bargaining agreement. Id. at 413. In Lin-
gle, a collective bargaining provision provided that employees could not be discharged
except for just or proper cause. Id. at 401. The collective bargaining agreement also
provided that disputes under the contract were to be submitted to arbitration. Id. De-
spite the arbitration provision, the Lingle employee filed a complaint in a circuit court
alleging she was discharged in retaliation for filing a worker's compensation claim. Id. at
402. The employer removed the case to a federal district court and sought dismissal of
the action on preemption grounds. Id. See also Ryherd v. General Cable Co., 124 Ill. 2d
418, 434, 530 N.E.2d 431, 438 (1988) (retaliatory discharge claim not preempted by
LMRA, even if an employee had previously raised the claim as a grievance under the
collective bargaining agreement and had taken it to arbitration).
52. Krasinski, 124 Ill. 2d at 485, 530 N.E.2d at 469.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 495, 530 N.E.2d at 473.
55. Id. at 490, 530 N.E.2d at 471.
56. Id. at 493, 530 N.E.2d at 473.
57. Id. at 493-94, 530 N.E.2d at 472-73. Congress established the NLRB in part to
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tract, rather it arises out of state law. 58
In light of the United State Supreme Court's decision in Lingle v.
Norge Division of Magic Chef and the Illinois Supreme Court's de-
cision in Krasinski, courts will scrutinize state tort actions to deter-
mine if they are preempted by federal law. If the state tort action
can be resolved without reference to the collective bargaining
agreement, the claim will not be preempted. If an employee alleges
a violation of a collective bargaining agreement and a state tort
claim, the employee may not be bound solely by the dispute resolu-
tion procedure in the collective bargaining agreement. In other
words, the employee will get "two bites of the apple."
B. Retaliatory Discharge
In employment discrimination charges based on Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964,- 9 the federal courts employ a shifting
burden of proof.' In Netzei v. United Parcel Service, Inc.,61 the
Illinois Appellate Court for the First District held that the shifting
burden of proof used in federal Title VII actions is not appropriate
for state retaliatory discharge claims.62
The employee in Netzel injured his knee while driving a truck for
his employer. 63 During his time off work, the employee filed for
determine whether the employer or the representative of the employees committed viola-
tions of the NLRA. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
58. 124 Ill. 2d at 494, 530 N.E.2d at 473.
59. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
60. The Supreme Court articulated the shifting burden of proof in Title VII actions in
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). The Court stated that in cases
of discrimination, the complainant has the initial burden of establishing a prima facie
case. Id. at 802. To do so, complainant must show (i) that complainant is a member of a
protected group; (ii) that complainant applied for and was qualified to perform a job for
which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite being qualified, complainant
was rejected; (iv) after the rejection, the position remained open and "the employer con-
tinued to seek applicants with complainant's qualifications." Id.
After complainant establishes a prima facie case, the burden then shifts to the em-
ployer to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the complainant's re-
jection. Id. This burden, however, is one of production only. The ultimate burden of
proof remains with the plaintiff. Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S.
248, 254-56 (1981). If the employer articulates a legitimate reason, the complainant must
then prove that the employer's reason for the challenged action is pretextual. McDonnell
Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804.
61. 181 Ill. App. 3d 808, 537 N.E.2d 1348 (1st Dist. 1989).
62. Id. at 812, 537 N.E.2d at 1350. Retaliatory discharge occurs when an employee
is discharged in retaliation for activities protected by a clearly mandated public policy
such as filing a worker's compensation claim. See Barr v. Kelso-Burnett Co., 106 Ill. 2d
520, 529, 478 N.E.2d 1354, 1358 (1985); Gonzalez v. Prestress Eng'g Corp., 115 Ill. 2d 1,
503 N.E.2d 308 (1986), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1032 (1987).
63. Netzel, 181 Ill. App. 3d at 811, 537 N.E.2d at 1349.
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and received workers' compensation." Two years later, the em-
ployee attempted to return to work but was discharged. 65 The em-
ployee alleged that he was discharged in retaliation for filing claims
under the Illinois Workers Compensation Act. 66 The employer al-
leged that the employee was discharged for returning to a non-
driving position in violation of company rules and a supervisor's
express instructions.67
At trial, the jury awarded the employee $200,000.68 The trial
court, however, ordered a new trial on both liability and dam-
ages. 69 The employee appealed the decision, arguing that the court
should have addressed the claim on the merits using the shifting
burden of proof employed in Title VII cases.7° The appellate court
held that the Title VII standard is not appropriate in state retalia-
tory discharge actions. 7' The court reasoned that a retaliatory dis-
charge action is very much like breach of an employment contract
and wrongful discharge actions. Both are reviewed under tradi-
tional tort analysis.72 Traditional tort analysis does not employ
burden shifting. Rather, the employee has the ultimate burden of
convincing the trier of fact, by a preponderance of the evidence,
that the employee was discharged in retaliation for executing a
right protected by Illinois public policy. 73 In contrast, the em-
ployer has the burden of persuasion of convincing the trier that the
employee was guilty of conduct justifying the discharge.74
64. Id.
65. Id. at 811, 537 N.E.2d at 1349-50. On two other occasions, the employee at-
tempted to return to work. Because of pain and swelling in his knee, he was given per-
mission to work in a non-driving capacity. The day he was discharged, the employee
similarly had left his driving position to work in a non-driving position. His employer
alleged that the employee was told not to leave his route. Id. at 811, 537 N.E.2d at 1349-
50.
66. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, paras. 138.1 -.30 (1987); Netzel, 181 Ill. App. 3d at 811,
537 N.E.2d at 1350.
67. 181 Ill. App. 3d at 811, 537 N.E.2d at 1349-50.
68. Id. at 810, 537 N.E.2d at 1349.
69. Id. at 811, 537 N.E.2d at 1350. The trial court stated that the filing of the
worker's compensation claim was too attenuated in time to be a reason for the discharge.
Id. The trial court also indicated that the damage award included impermissible punitive
damages and that it was calculated erroneously. Id. at 817-18, 537 N.E.2d at 1353-54.
70. Id. at 812, 537 N.E.2d at 1350. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
71. 181 Ill. App. 3d at 812, 537 N.E.2d at 1350.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. (citing Lukasik v. Ridell, Inc., 116 Il1. App. 3d 339, 346, 452 N.E.2d 55, 59
(1st Dist. 1983); Foster v. Springfield Clinic, 88 Ill. App. 3d 459, 464, 410 N.E.2d at 604,
608 (4th Dist. 1980)).
1990]
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In rejecting the Title VII burden of proof standard,75 the court
gave little guidance for situations in which traditional tort analysis
would be inadequate. For example, the trier of fact might believe
that the employer had a valid reason for the discharge, such as
excessive absenteeism, but at the same time, believe that the em-
ployer also was motivated by an unlawful reason, such as the em-
ployee's filing of a worker's compensation claim. Given the Netzel
holding, employees will have the difficult task of persuading the
trier of fact that the unlawful reason was the predominate reason
for the discharge.76
IV. THE PUBLIC SECTOR
A. Illinois Public Labor Relations Act
1. Arbitration
The Illinois Public Labor Relations Act ("IPLRA") 77 provides
that all grievance disputes must be resolved by final and binding
arbitration, unless there is a contrary agreement between the em-
ployer and the union.78 In a case decided under a similar provision
of the Illinois Educational Labor Relations Act ("IELRA"), 79 the
Illinois Supreme Court held that a labor arbitration award must be
enforced if the arbitrator acted within the scope of his authority
and the award draws its essence from the parties' collective-bar-
gaining agreement.8 0 During the Survey year, the Illinois Supreme
Court refused to vacate an arbitrator's award to reinstate mental
health employees discharged because of their involvement in the
accidental death of a patient in American Federation of State
County and Municipal Employees v. Illinois Department of Mental
Health.8 '
In American Federation, two employees who worked at a state
mental health facility for the severely mentally retarded received
75. With regard to the question of damages, the court held that a new trial on the
basis of damages was proper. Netzel, 181 Ill. App. 3d at 817, 537 N.E.2d at 1351.
76. For a discussion of mixed motive employee discharge cases, see infra notes 102-18
and accompanying text.
77. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, paras. 1601-1627 (1987).
78. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, para. 1608 (1987).
79. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, paras. 1701-1721 (1987) [hereinafter the "IELRA"].
80. Board of Trustees of Community College Dist. No. 508 v. Cook County College
Teachers Union, 74 Ill. 2d 412, 421, 386 N.E.2d 47, 51 (1979). Both the IELRA and the
IPLRA evidence the legislature's intent to further the goals of labor peace by encourag-
ing the arbitration of disputes. See Board of Educ. v. Compton, 123 Ill. 2d 216, 526
N.E.2d 149 (1988), a decision in which the Illinois Supreme Court divested the circuit
courts of the power to review questions of arbitrability arising under the IELRA.
81. 124 Ill. 2d 246, 529 N.E.2d 534 (1988).
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permission to go on an errand off the facility's premises.8 2 Rather
than returning directly to work, the employees took an unauthor-
ized shopping trip for approximately an hour and a half. During
this time, a resident accidentally died."a The two employees, how-
ever, were not assigned to watch this patient; they were assigned to
a different wing. On that particular day, the facility was short-
staffed."4 As a result of the accident and the unauthorized trip, the
Department of Mental Health terminated the employees for mis-
treatment of a service recipient. 85 Pursuant to the collective bar-
gaining agreement between the Department and the union
representing the employees, the union filed a grievance challenging
the discharge and pursued it to arbitration. 86
The arbitrator held that the discharge was not for just cause be-
cause there was no direct link between the resident's death and the
employees' unauthorized absence. 7 The arbitrator did find, how-
ever, that the conduct constituted mistreatment of a service recipi-
ent.88 Despite this conclusion, there were mitigating factors
weighing against termination.89 The discharged employees had ex-
emplary work records and always treated the residents like family.
Moreover, they admitted their wrongdoing, expressed remorse and
gave straightforward and truthful testimony at the arbitration
hearing. It was unlikely that they would repeat their actions.90
Accordingly, the arbitrator reduced the discipline from discharge,
to four months unpaid suspension. 91
The union brought an action in the circuit court to enforce the
award.92 Deeming the arbitrator's award "absurd and beyond
comprehension," the court refused enforcement. The court found
no authority in the collective bargaining agreement for the arbitra-
tor to consider mitigating circumstances.9 3 According to the cir-
cuit court, the award represented a severe and extreme departure
82. Id. at 250, 529 N.E.2d at 536. The employees went to purchase barbecue supplies
for a resident event. Id.
83. Id. at 251, 529 N.E.2d at 536. The patient died when he was left unattended
while tied to a toilet seat, with the back of a wheelchair placed in front of him. It ap-
peared as though he accidentally fell forward and broke his neck. Id.
84. Id. at 250-51, 529 N.E.2d at 536.
85. Id. at 251, 529 N.E.2d at 536.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 251-52, 529 N.E.2d at 536.
88. Id. at 251, 529 N.E.2d at 536.
89. Id. at 252, 529 N.E.2d at 536.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 251, 529 N.E.2d at 536.
92. Id. at 252, 529 N.E.2d at 536.
93. Id.
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from the public policy of protecting mental health patients.94
The appellate court reversed, holding that the arbitrator did not
exceed his authority by considering mitigating factors and that the
award did not violate Illinois public policy.9" On further appeal,
the Illinois Supreme court stated that in order to vacate arbitration
awards, a reviewing court must find that the contract, as inter-
preted by the arbitrator, violated some explicit public policy 96 that
is both well-defined and ascertainable by reference to laws and
legal precedent. General consideration of public interest will not
suffice. 97 The court noted that there is no public policy that re-
quires discharge of all employees found guilty of patient mistreat-
ment;98 therefore, the four-month suspension was appropriate. 99
American Federation is significant because its recognizes a public
policy exception to enforcement of an arbitrator's award under the
IPLRA.Y Even though the exception is narrowly drawn, rather
than based upon some vague notion of public good," 1 it will now
be extremely difficult for courts to second-guess arbitrators on pub-
lic policy grounds. The decision should serve to discourage suits to
94. Id.
95. Id. at 252-53, 529 N.E.2d at 536-37 (citing American Fed'n, 158 Ill. App. 3d 584,
593, 511 N.E.2d 749, 755 (1st Dist.).
96. American Fed'n, 124 Ill. 2d at 261, 529 N.E.2d at 540-41 (citing Meissner v.
Caravello, 4 Ill. App. 2d 428, 432-33, 124 N.E.2d 615, 617 (1st Dist. 1954)).
97. Id. at 261, 529 N.E.2d at 540. See e.g. W.R. Grace and Co. v. Local Union 759,
461 U.S. 757, 766 (1983).
98. American Fed'n, 124 Ill. 2d 246, 263, 529 N.E.2d at 541. The court stated that
this rule is particularly justified when the arbitrator finds that the employees were exem-
plary mental health employees and that there was no nexus between the employees' in-
fractions and the death of a mental health patient. The court also noted that the
arbitrator did not condone the employees' actions. Rather, he issued punishment that he
believed was commensurate with the misconduct. Id. at 264-65, 529 N.E.2d at 542.
99. Id. at 265, 529 N.E.2d at 542.
100. The decision becomes even more significant because a decision rendered under
one public bargaining statute may serve as precedent for a decision rendered under the
other. Illinois Public Labor Relations Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, para. 1615.1 (1988);
Illinois Educational Labor Relations Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, para. 1715.1 (1988).
See infra notes 197-207 and accompanying text (for further discussion of the relationship
between arbitration and public policy).
101. Cf United Paperworker Int'l Union v. Misco, 484 U.S. 29 (1987). In Misco, the
Fifth Circuit had ruled that reinstatement of an employee caught smoking marijuana on
company premises was contrary to public policy because of general safety concerns about
operating industrial machinery while under the influence of drugs. Misco, 768 F.2d 739,
743 (5th Cir. 1985). The Supreme Court reversed, holding that in the absence of fraud or
dishonesty by the arbitrator, a federal court could not refuse to enforce an arbitration
award on public policy grounds. 484 U.S. at 38, 45. The Court stated that it does not
sanction "a broad judicial power to set aside arbitration awards as against public policy."
Id. at 43.
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vacate arbitration awards and should foster the goal of providing a
quick, inexpensive method of resolving labor disputes.
2. Mixed Motive Discharges
An employer may lawfully discharge an employee for any
number of commonly understood reasons, such as poor perform-
ance or chronic absenteeism. Occasionally, an employer may pos-
sess both a lawful and unlawful reason for wanting to terminate an
employee. In this situation, it may be impossible to ascertain
which motive actually prompted the discharge. In mixed motive
cases brought under the National Labor Relations Act, 11 2 an em-
ployee establishes a prima facie case of unlawful discrimination by
showing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the adverse ac-
tion was based in whole or in part on antiunion animus or that the
employee's protected conduct was a substantial or motivating fac-
tor. 03 Once the employee establishes a prima facia case, the bur-
den shifts to the employer to show that the employee would have
been discharged for a legitimate business reason notwithstanding
the employer's antiunion animus. During the Survey year, the
Illinois Supreme Court held that the model of proof utilized in fed-
eral labor law is appropriate for mixed motive discharges under the
IPLRA. l05
In City of Burbank v. Labor Relations Board, 10 a public works
102. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1986 & Supp. V 1987). See e.g., NLRB v. Transportation
Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393, 398-405 (1983) (union organizing, leaving keys in bus,
taking unauthorized breaks); Roscello v. Southwest Airlines Co., 726 F.2d 217, 222-23
(5th Cir. 1984) (union organizing, failure to perform duties, excessive absenteeism).
103. City of Burbank v. Labor Relations Bd. 128 Ill. 2d 335, 345, 538 N.E.2d 1146,
1150 (1989), (citing Transportation Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393, 401 (1983)). In
City of Burbank, the court noted that antiunion animus may be reasonably inferred from
a variety of factors, including the employer's expressed hostility toward, and knowledge
of, unionization; the proximity in time between the employee's union activity and his
discharge; a pattern of conduct that targets union supporters for adverse employment
actions; shifting explanations for the discharge; and inconsistencies between the proffered
reason for the discharge and other actions of the employer (citations omitted).
104. City of Burbank, 128 Ill. 2d at 346, 538 N.E.2d at 1150 (citing Transportation
Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393, 401-02 (1983); Communication Workers of Am., Local
5008 v. NLRB, 784 F.2d 847, 850 (7th Cir. 1986)).
105. Id. at 345-46, 538 N.E.2d at 1149-50. The Illinois Appellate Court for the
Fourth District held that the proper standard of review under the IPLRA is also the
standard of review used under the NLRA in Hardin County Educ. Ass'n v. IELRB, 174
Ill. App. 3d 168, 178, 528 N.E.2d 737, 742 (4th Dist. 1988) (discharge for disciplinary
problems and pro-union activity).
106. 128 Ill. 2d 335, 538 N.E.2d 1146 (1989). City of Burbank is discussed extensively
in Troy and Fehringer, State and Local Government, 21 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 601, 610
(1990).
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department employee arranged for a union organizing meeting. 0 7
After expressing hostility to the union, the employer "reorga-
nized," thereby eliminating the employee's position. °8 The union
filed an unfair labor practice charge with the Illinois State Labor
Board ("ISLRB") alleging that the employee was discharged be-
cause he supported the union. °9 The City contended that the em-
ployee's position was eliminated purely because of fiscal
considerations. 10 An ISLRB hearing officer determined that the
City's reasons were pretextual."' Subsequently, the ISLRB
adopted the hearing officer's recommendation to reinstate the em-
ployee with back pay.' 12 The appellate court affirmed, using the
same shifting burden of proof analysis used by the NLRB and the
federal courts to decide discrimination cases arising under the
NLRA. 113
The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's analysis
and its conclusion." 4 The court noted that because the IPLRA is
modeled after the NLRA, the NLRA standard of proof should be
applied to mixed motive cases arising under the IPLRA." 5 The
court also stated that in order for a trier of fact to infer antiunion
motivation, the employee must show more than that the employer
had knowledge of an employee's protected activity. " 6 In contrast,
the employer's knowledge of the activity, coupled with the em-
ployer's inability to articulate any plausible, legitimate reason for
its action, is sufficient for a finding of an unlawful discharge.' 'I
City of Burbank establishes the standard courts will follow in
mixed motive discharge cases arising under the Illinois public bar-
107. City of Burbank, 128 Ill. 2d at 340, 538 N.E.2d at 1147.
108. Id. at 339, 538 N.E.2d at 1147. The only position eliminated was that of the
supervisor who actively supported the union. A supervisor with similar functions who
opposed the union did not have his position eliminated. Id. The "restructuring" oc-
curred two days before the union election. Id. at 341, 538 N.E.2d at 1148. The IPLRA
prohibits employers from preventing employees from forming, joining, or assisting in at-
tempts to organize. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, para. 1606 (1987).
109. City of Burbank, 128 Ill. 2d at 342, 538 N.E.2d at 1148. The City was charged
with violating section 10 (a) (1) - (3) of the IPLRA. Id. at 339, 538 N.E.2d at 1147.
110. Id. at 342, 349-50, 538 N.E.2d at 1148, 1151-52. The City claimed that a report
showed it would be cheaper and more efficient to hire private contractors. The report,
however, was not published until after the "restructuring." Id. at 350, 538 N.E.2d at
1152.
111. Id. at 343, 538 N.E.2d at 1148.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 343-44, 538 N.E.2d at 1148-49.
114. Id. at 346, 538 N.E.2d at 1150.
115. Id. at 345, 538 N.E.2d at 1149.
116. Id. at 348, 538 N.E.2d at 1151.
117. Id. at 349, 538 N.E.2d at 1151.
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gaining statutes.I'8 If an employee shows by a preponderance of
the evidence that an employer took adverse action based in whole
or in part on impermissible motivation, the employee will not nec-
essarily prevail. Even if the employer harbored unlawful motives,
as long as it can articulate any legitimate reason for its action, the
discharge may not be deemed unlawful.
3. Joint Employment
The Illinois Constitution requires that funding for the circuit
courts be provided by the counties in which the circuit courts pre-
side. 1 9 During the Survey year, the Illinois Supreme Court held in
Orenic v. Illinois State Labor Relations Board, 20 that despite fund-
ing by the counties, judges of the circuit courts are not joint em-
ployers of county employees for purposes of collective bargaining
under the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act.' 2'
In Orenic, various unions attempted to organize employees of
the circuit courts in four Illinois counties.1 22 The four chief judges
affected contended that the ISLRB did not have jurisdiction over
the counties as joint employers of court employees 23 and sought a
writ of prohibition or mandamus against the ISLRB.' 24 The judges
argued that the State, by its agent the chief judge, is the sole em-
ployer of State judicial branch employees. 25  The judges also
claimed that the counties' funding role in the court system did not
make the court employees, county employees.126
The ISLRB contended that the counties and the chief judges
were joint employers.' 27 First, the ISLRB noted it has held con-
sistently that an employer is an entity "whose presence is necessary
to create an effective bargaining relationship."' 28 Second, the IS-
118. See supra notes 102-05 and accompanying text.
119. The Illinois Constitution provides that "all salaries and such expenses... shall
be paid by the State, except that Appellate, Circuit and Associate Judges shall receive
such additional compensation from counties within their district or circuit as may be
provided by law." ILL. CONST. art. VI § 14.
120. 127 Ill. 2d 453, 537 N.E.2d 784 (1989).
121. Id. at 455-56, 537 N.E.2d at 786.
122. Id. at 456-57, 537 N.E.2d at 786. See Troy and Fehringer, supra note 106 at 614
n. 103 (for a complete description of the various unions and bargaining units at issue).
123. 127 Ill. 2d at 458-59, 537 N.E.2d at 787.
124. Id. at 459-60, 537 N.E.2d at 787.
125. Id. at 459, 537 N.E.2d at 787.
126. Id. Specifically, the judges contended that the statutes requiring counties to
fund the courts violate provisions of the Illinois Constitution creating a unified State
court system. Id. (citing ILL. CONST. art. VI § 1).
127. Id. at 463-65, 537 N.E.2d at 789-90.
128. Id. at 462, 537 N.E.2d at 789. See County of Tazewell, 1 Pub. Employee Rep.
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LRB has defined "employer," under the statute, by determining
who has the authority to hire, promote, evaluate, discipline, dis-
charge and set work rules and benefit levels.1 29 The ISLRB noted
that the county has the authority to perform these very functions
and it has funding authority as well; therefore, the ISLRB con-
cluded that the county and the chief judges were both necessary to
the bargaining process. 1 30
The Illinois Supreme Court rejected the ISLRB's argument.
The court stated that it is improper to evaluate joint employment
in the public sector using the same analysis used in the private sec-
tor. "I The court noted that to do so would neglect both the special
role of the public employer as representative of the public inter-
est, 132 as well as the involvement of the legislative branch. 133
In addition, forcing judges to bargain as joint employers with the
counties could violate the Illinois Constitution,1 34 which prohibits
a local entity from imposing controls or burdens on the judicial
system. 135 If the counties and chief justices were required to bar-
gain collectively, the counties would have significant control over
funding issues.131 If a county were intransigent on a salary issue, it
could deadlock negotiations, thereby jeopardizing the courts' func-
tioning. 137 This substantial burden on the judicial system would be
unconstitutional. 138
The result of Orenic is that it will be more difficult for unions to
organize judicial employees for purposes of collective bargaining.
Many judicial offices have few employees. It will be impractical
and economically irrational for a union to organize many judicial
offices. Without the ability to combine bargaining unit organizing
(Ill.) para. 2022, No. S-RC-2 (ISLRB Sept. 27, 1985); DuPage County Board, 1 Pub.
Employee Rep. (Ill.) para. 2003, Nos. S-RC-9, S-RC-17 (ISLRB Apr. 16, 1985).
129. Orenic, 129 Ill. 2d at 463, 537 N.E.2d at 789. (citing DuPage County Board, 1
Pub. Employee Rep. (Ill.) para. 2003, at VIII- 12). The federal test for joint employers is
whether two or more employers exert significant control over the same employees, and
whether the evidence demonstrates that they share or co-determine matters governing
essential terms and conditions of employment. NLRB v. Browning-Ferris Indus., 691
F.2d 1117, 1124 (3d Cir. 1982).
130. Orenic, 127 Ill. 2d at 462-63, 537 N.E.2d at 789.
131. Id. at 476-77, 537 N.E.2d at 795.
132. Id. at 478-79, 537 N.E.2d at 796. (citing Developments in the Law: Public Em-
ployment, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1611, 1681 (1984)).
133. Id. at 478, 537 N.E.2d at 796.
134. Id. at 477, 537 N.E.2d at 796.
135. Id. at 480, 537 N.E. at 797. (citing Ampersand, Inc. v. Finley, 61 Ill. 2d 537,
542, 338 N.E.2d 15, 18 (1975)).
136. Id. at 480-81, 537 N.E.2d at 797.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 481, 537 N.E.2d at 797.
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efforts directed at other county employees, unions may very well
abandon their interest in organizing this sector of the labor force
altogether. Additionally, the decision shows the importance the
Illinois Supreme Court attaches to the different policy considera-
tions that make private labor law analysis sometimes inappropriate
for public labor law analysis.
4. Discrimination
The Illinois Public Labor Relations Act provides that an em-
ployer may not discriminate with regard to hiring, tenure of em-
ployment, or terms or conditions of employment.' 39 In City of
Chicago v. Illinois Local Labor Relations Board,14° the Illinois Ap-
pellate Court for the First District held that an employee need not
prove financial or tangible harm for a showing of discrimination
under the IPLRA.1 41
In City of Chicago, the employer filed disciplinary proceedings
against an active union supporter for lying on her resume, mishan-
dling funds, refusing orders and violating confidentiality.' 42 The
employee then filed an unfair labor practice charge against the
City, alleging that the disciplinary measures constituted discrimi-
nation on the basis of union activity. 4 3 The ILLRB accepted a
hearing officer's determination that the employee's claims were
valid. The ILLRB ordered the employer to rescind, withdraw and
discontinue disciplinary claims against the employee, remove refer-
ences to the disciplinary actions from her personnel file, and post
notice of the ILLRB's decision.'I
The City appealed on the grounds that the ILLRB's decision
was incorrect as a matter of law because there was no evidence that
the employee had suffered a financial loss as a result of the disci-
pline. In the alternative, the City argued that the employee did not
139. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, para. 1610(a)(2) (1987). The Act established the Illi-
nois Local Labor Relations Board ("ILLRB"), to administer public employee labor rela-
tions in Cook County, Illinois, and the Illinois State Labor Relations Board, to
administer all other public employee labor relations in the State. Public educational em-
ployee labor relations are governed by the Illinois Educational Labor Relations Act. The
statutes were enacted at the same time and contain nearly-identical provisions. See
Malin, Implementing the Illinois Educational Labor Relations Act, 61 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 101 (1985) (for a comparison of the acts).
140. 182 Ill. App. 3d 588, 536 N.E.2d 1219 (1st Dist. 1988).
141. Id. at 594-95, 536 N.E.2d at 1223-24.
142. Id. at 590-91, 536 N.E.2d at 1221.
143. Id. at 589, 536 N.E.2d at 1220.
144. Id. at 589-90, 536 N.E.2d at 1220.
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establish a prima facie case of discrimination.145 The employee ar-
gued that discrimination does not require monetary loss and that
harassment is sufficient to establish an unfair labor practice.'46 The
appellate court agreed and held that harassment provides a suffi-
cient basis for a violation of the IPLRA.'47 The court noted that
the statute's language does not specifically require financial or tan-
gible harm'" and that its non-discrimination provisions were
broad enough to encompass harassment.149
The court's holding may make it easier for employees disci-
plined, short of firing, to sustain an unfair labor practice claim
under the IPLRA. The decision suggests that when an employer
takes action against an employee because of pro-union activity, the
employer has committed an unfair labor practice even if the em-
ployee suffers no financial harm. The court also makes clear that
harassment by itself is sufficient to make out an unfair labor prac-
tice claim under the IPLRA.
B. Illinois Educational Labor Relations Act
1. Mandatory Subjects of Bargaining
The Illinois Educational Labor Relations Act' 5° provides for col-
lective bargaining between public educational employers and pub-
lic school employees. 15' A public educational employer is not
145. Id. at 592-93, 536 N.E.2d at 1222. The City was precluded from arguing that
the employee suffered no financial consequences as a result of the alleged breach of confi-
dentiality. For that infraction, she was suspended.
146. Id. at 593, 536 N.E.2d at 1222. The employee also asserted that her employer's
actions had an adverse, tangible impact on her job tenure and conditions of employment.
Id.
147. Id. at 594-95, 536 N.E.2d at 1223-24.
148. Id. at 594-95, 536 N.E.2d at 1223.
149. Id. at 594-95, 536 N.E.2d at 1223-24 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, para.
1610(a)(3) (1987) providing that an employer may not "discharge or otherwise discrimi-
nate" (emphasis in opinion)).
150. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, paras. 1701-1721 (1987).
151. Id. para. 1710(a). In addition to the protection afforded public educational em-
ployees by the IELRA, Illinois public school teachers are also protected by the Illinois
School Code. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, para. 24-13 (1987). Although the IELRA gov-
erns the relationship between public educational employers and employee organizations
with regard to collective bargaining matters, the Code governs other concerns that may
arise during the course of the teacher-school authority relationship. For example, the
Code provides that tenure rights may not be affected by a leave of absence mutually
agreed upon by the teacher and the school board.
During the Survey year, the Illinois Appellate Court for the Fifth District held that the
school board may attach conditions to a leave of absence without protecting a teacher's
tenure. In Fisher v. Board of Educ., 181 Ill. App. 3d 653, 658, 537 N.E.2d 354, 357-58
(5th Dist. 1989), a tenured teacher requested that the school board allow her to take a
one-year leave of absence for medical reasons. Id. at 655, 537 N.E.2d at 355. The school
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required to bargain over matters of inherent managerial policy, but
it must bargain collectively over policy matters "directly affecting
wages, hours and terms and conditions of employment as well as
the impact thereon . . ,. . Since the enactment of the public
employee bargaining acts in 1984, the law regarding the scope of
mandatory bargaining was unclear. During the Survey year, the
Illinois Appellate Court for the Fourth District held that class size
is a mandatory subject for bargaining.'5 3
In Decatur Board of Education v. Illinois Educational Labor Re-
lations Board, the school district refused to bargain over class size
and its impact upon teachers' salary, preparation and planning
time and other terms and conditions of employment. '54 The union
then filed an unfair labor practice claim with the IELRB.' 5" The
school district disagreed with the union's position that class size
was a mandatory subject of bargaining. 156
The IELRB concluded that class size directly affects, and there-
fore has an impact, on terms and conditions of employment, '57 but
board considered the teacher's request and stated that her leave of absence was not "mu-
tually agreeable." Id. A non-tenured teacher was then hired to fill the position and the
tenured teacher did not object. The school board considered the teacher's written request
to return and determined that it was not obligated to reemploy her. The teacher then
petitioned the circuit court to order the school board to reinstate her. Id. at 654, 537
N.E.2d at 355. The circuit court granted summary judgment in the school board's favor.
Id. The teacher appealed, contending that the school board was prohibited from attach-
ing conditions on her leave affecting tenure rights. The appellate court affirmed on the
ground that the parties never had a "mutual agreement" as required by the Code.
152. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, para. 1704 (1987). Similarly, section 4 of the Illinois
Public Labor Relations Act, ILL REV. STAT. ch. 48, para. 1604 (1987) exempts non-
educational public employers from bargaining over matters of inherent managerial pol-
icy. In Departments of Central Management Servs. and Corrections v. AFSCME, No. S-
CA-88-86 (ISLRB September 14, 1988), the ISLRB held that the employer could insti-
tute a limited drug testing program for its employees without first bargaining over the
decision. The employer had a duty, however, to bargain over the impact of its new
policy. After the Survey period concluded, the Illinois Appellate Court for the Fourth
District affirmed, finding that the Department's need for stricter security measures did
not lend itself to the bargaining process. The court stated that the ISLRB properly bal-
anced the impact of the testing policy on workers' rights against the State's need to curb
criminal activity in its prisons. AFSCME v. ISLRB, 190 Ill. App. 3d 259, 546 N.E.2d
687 (4th Dist. 1989) (citing with approval the balancing test used in Decatur Bd. of Educ.
v. IELRB, 180 Ill. App. 3d 770, 536 N.E.2d 743 (1st Dist. 1989). See infra notes 153-63
and accompanying text (for further discussion of Decatur).
153. 180 Ill. App. 3d 770, 777, 536 N.E.2d 743, 748 (4th Dist. 1989). "Class size"
represents the number of students per class.
154. Id. at 771-72, 536 N.E.2d at 744.
155. Id. at 771, 536 N.E.2d at 744.
156. Id. at 772, 536 N.E.2d at 744. The school district also contended that the union
had waived its right to bargain on the subject. Id. The court, however, rejected this
argument because the parties had stipulated otherwise. Id.
157. Id. at 772, 536 N.E.2d at 744-45. (citing Decatur School Dist. No. 61, 4 Pub.
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a direct effect on a term or condition of employment does not auto-
matically create a mandatory duty to bargain. 15  The IELRB used
a balancing test, to measure employee interests against the school
district interests in maintaining unencumbered control over mana-
gerial policy, 5 9 and concluded that the employer had a duty to
bargain. 160
The court's problem was to reconcile two seemingly irreconcila-
ble provisions in the statute. On one hand, the employer must ne-
gotiate with the union over certain subjects of bargaining. On the
other, the employer need not bargain over matters that are "inher-
ently managerial." The appellate court determined that the
IELRB's balancing test was appropriate to decide the matter.' 6'
The court stated that the legislature could not have intended a lit-
eral interpretation of "directly affect" and "impact."'' 62 A literal
interpretation would negate the provision providing that employers
need not bargain over matters of inherent managerial policy be-
cause almost everything affects and impacts upon terms and condi-
tions of employment. 163
Decatur is significant, not only for its direct impact upon teach-
ers' working conditions in an era of educational reform, but also
for the court's endorsement of the Board's balancing approach. In
the future, courts will have to weigh any new policy's impact on
working conditions, against an employer's need for managerial dis-
cretion and control.
2. Arbitration
The IELRA is a comprehensive statute, creating rights and du-
ties that did not exist at common law. 64 For example, the Act
provides for binding arbitration of disputes concerning a collective
Employee Rep. (Ill.) para. 1076, case No. 86-CA-0042-S (ILLRB, May 17, 1988)). Two
of the three Board members determined that class size directly affects terms and condi-
tions; one member determined that it did not have a direct effect but had an impact on
employment terms, thus triggering a duty to bargain. Id. at 772, 536 N.E.2d at 744-45.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 772, 536 N.E.2d at 745. The agency also stated that the balancing test
could be used to determine if the impact of a particular policy decision would subject the
topic to mandatory bargaining. Id. at 772-73, 536 N.E.2d at 745.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 772, 536 N.E.2d at 744-45.
162. Id. at 773, 536 N.E.2d at 745.
163. The court pointed out that a school district may address its concern over fiscal
problems by taking a firm position during collective bargaining. Id. at 775-77, 536 N.E.2d
at 747.
164. Board of Educ. v. Compton, 123 Ill. 2d 216, 220-21, 526 N.E.2d 149, 151-52
(1988).
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bargaining agreement's interpretation. 65 In an important case de-
cided during the last Survey period, Board of Education v.
Compton, 66 the Illinois Supreme Court divested circuit courts of
the authority to review IELRA arbitration awards, as well as the
authority to decide whether a disagreement over the terms of a
collective bargaining agreement is properly subject to
arbitration. 167
During the current Survey period, the Illinois Supreme Court
was confronted with an issue not addressed in Compton, that is,
whether circuit courts retain the power to enjoin arbitration. In
Board of Education v. Warren Township High School Federation of
Teachers, Local 504,168 the court held that circuit courts do not
retain the power to enjoin arbitration in the context of public edu-
cational disputes. In Warren Township, a school district refused to
rehire a nontenured teacher on probationary status.' 69 The union
filed a grievance alleging that certain provisions in the collective
bargaining agreement pertaining to teacher evaluations were not
followed. When the union tried to take the grievance to arbitra-
tion, the employer refused on the grounds that the grievance was
inarbitrable. 70 After the union filed an unfair labor practice charge
with the IELRB, and after the agency issued a complaint, the
school district obtained, from the circuit court, a preliminary in-
junction to prevent the union from proceeding with the arbitration
proceeding. 17
Recognizing the broad legislative policy behind the IELRA to
promote peaceful relationships between educational employers and
their employees, the court indicated that to allow judicial interven-
tion in these types of disputes would disrupt the statutory
scheme. 72 The court determined that the circuit court lacked ju-
risdiction to enjoin arbitration and that the question of arbitrability
is for the IELRB to decide in the first instance. 73 Warren Town-
ship is the most recent of several Illinois decisions giving the
165. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, para. 1710 (c) (1987)
166. 123 Ill. 2d 216, 526 N.E.2d 149 (1988). See generally, Gecker and Albrecht,
Labor Law, 20 Loy. U. CHi. L.J. 527, 548-551 (1989).
167. Id. at 225, 526 N.E.2d at 153.
168. 128 I11. 2d 155, 538 N.E.2d 524 (1989).
169. Id. at 165, 538 N.E.2d at 529.
170. The employer argued that it had a nondelegable right to make rehiring decisions
under the Illinois School Code as a matter of inherent managerial control. Id. at 160, 538
N.E.2d at 526.
171. Id. at 159, 538 N.E.2d at 525.
172. Id. at 165, 538 N.E.2d at 529.
173. Id. at 166, 538 N.E.2d at 529.
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IELRB, rather than the courts, the broad authority to be the sole
reviewing forum for arbitration awards and questions of arbi-
trability.17 4 If the agency fails to fulfil its mandate, the loss of a
judicial forum for review of awards may someday prompt legisla-
tive action.
In a case involving the interplay between a civil service statute
and the IELRA, Board of Governors of State Colleges and Universi-
ties v. IELRB, 75 the Illinois Appellate Court for the Fourth Dis-
trict held that the grievance-arbitration provisions of the IELRA
do not displace the dispute resolution procedure provided by the
civil service system.
The case arose when a terminated employee filed a grievance
pursuant to the parties' collective bargaining agreement.' 76 Her
former employer informed her that her only option was to contest
her discharge through the Merit Board of the State Universities
Civil Service System. 177 The Merit Board hearing officer con-
cluded that the employer had cause to discharge the employee. 7
Subsequently, the union filed charges with the IELRB. The
IELRB adopted an agency hearing officer's determination that the
employer had committed an unfair labor practice and her recom-
mended remedial order that the employer process the grievance. 17
9
Of particular significance was the Board's conclusion that the bar-
gaining agreement and its grievance-arbitration mechanism pro-
vided an alternative dispute resolution that supplemented, rather
than displaced, the Civil Service procedure.180 The employer had
argued that Merit Review Board is the exclusive remedy available
to a Civil Service employee to protest a discharge.
The Illinois Supreme Court disagreed with the employer's con-
tention that the arbitration procedure would supplant the Civil
Service scheme. 8 ' The Court looked at the legislative scheme of
both the Civil Service Act and the IELRA and concluded that it
174. See e.g., Board of Educ. v. Chicago Teachers Union, 86 Ill. 2d 469, 427 N.E.2d
1199 (1981), in which the court held that the IELRA removed from the courts their
former jurisdiction to vacate arbitration awards under the Uniform Arbitration Act, ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 10, paras. 102-123 (1987).
175. 170 Ill. App. 3d 463, 480, 524 N.E.2d 758, 768 (1988).
176. Id. at 467, 524 N.E.2d at 759.
177. Created pursuant to ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, para. 38(b)(3) (1985).
178. Board of Governors, 170 Ill App. 3d at 467, 524 N.E.2d at 759. At the time, the
employee failed to raise her objection to the proceeding. The Illinois Supreme Court
considered this lapse fatal. See infra note 183 and accompanying text.
179. 170 Ill. App. 3d at 470, 524 N.E.2d at 761.
180. Id. at 469, 524 N.E.2d at 761.
181. Id. at 478, 524 N.E.2d at 766.
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was the legislature's intent to enlarge upon employee rights. 18 2 Ac-
cordingly, a civil service employee has two coextensive dispute res-
olution devices available.' 83
C. Illinois Pension Code
The Firefighters' Pension Fund Act'84 requires municipalities to
establish and administer pension funds for the benefit of firefighters
and their families. 185 The Act also provides that if a firefighter is
disabled while performing a job-related matter, the firefighter is en-
titled to sixty-five percent of his monthly salary, attached to rank,
at the date of his removal from a municipality's fire department
payroll.'86 The Act additionally prohibits a municipality from pro-
viding any type of retirement or annuity benefit to a firefighter
other than through establishment of a fund as provided in the
Act. 187
During the Survey year, the Illinois Appellate Court for the Sec-
ond District held that a municipality cannot enter into a collective
bargaining agreement that provides for more pension benefits than
those established in the Pension Fund Act.'88 In City of De Kalb v.
International Association of Fire Fighters, the City and the fire-
men's union entered into a collective bargaining agreement which
provided that fire fighters who received job-related injuries would
receive supplemental differential disability pay equal to the differ-
ence between their normal pay and the benefits received under the
Illinois Workmen's Compensation Act,8 9 Workmen's Occupa-
tional Disease Act,"9 or the Illinois Pension Code. 191 The City
subsequently learned that the differential disability payments pro-
182. Id. at 480, 524 N.E.2d at 768.
183. Although affirming the IELRB's finding that the employer had committed an
unfair labor practice by refusing to process the grievance, the court vacated the agency's
remedial order on the grounds that the employee failed to seek a stay and judicial review
of the Merit Board's decision. Id. at 483, 524 N.E.2d at 770.
184. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 108, paras. 4-101 to 4-144 (1987).
185. Id. para. 4-101.
186. Id. para. 4-110.
187. Id. para. 4-142.
188. 182 Ill. App. 3d 367, 373, 538 N.E.2d 867, 870-71 (2d Dist. 1989).
189. Id. at 369, 538 N.E.2d at 868 (referring to ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, paras. 138.1-
.30 (1987)).
190. Id. (referring to ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, paras. 172.36 -.62 (1987)).
191. Id. (referring to ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 108, paras. 4-101 to 4-144 (1985). For
example, if a fire fighter's base pay were $2000 per month, a disabled employee would
receive $1,300 per month under the pension plan (65% of $2000) and $700 per month
under the differential pay agreement.
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vision in the collective bargaining agreement was unlawful 92 and
discontinued the differential payments. The City entered into a
new collective bargaining agreement that did not include this pro-
vision.' 93 The union and the City also signed a separate agreement
that provided that if an arbitrator or a court determined that the
differential payments did not violate Illinois public policy, the pay-
ments would be reinstituted.' 94
After the new agreement was signed, the union filed a grievance
on behalf of two members who were denied differential pay.'" The
union contended that the City was bound by the original collective
bargaining agreement. 196 The City responded that it could not be
bound because the original agreement violated Illinois public pol-
icy insofar as it conflicted with the Pension Code, a statute passed
by the Illinois Legislature. 97 The grievance went to arbitration,
whereby an arbitrator sustained it and ordered differential pay. 198
The City sought to vacate the arbitrator's decision by appeal to the
circuit court. 199 The union filed a motion to dismiss, which was
granted.
On appeal, the City reiterated its public policy argument.2 1 The
union contended that the City had waived its right to challenge the
decision because it had submitted the issue to arbitration. 20 2 The
union also argued that the payments were not prohibited by Illi-
nois public policy because the payments were continuing compen-
sation, and not supplemental pension benefits.20 3
The court rejected the union's position and held that the pay-
ments violated Illinois public policy.2' It found no merit in the
argument that the supplemental pension payments should be char-
acterized as continuing compensation. 2 5  Because the Pension
192. 182 Ill. App. 3d at 369, 538 N.E.2d at 868.
193. Id. at 369-70, 538 N.E.2d at 868.
194. Id. at 370, 538 N.E.2d at 868.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 370, 538 N.E.2d at 869.
198. Id. at 370, 538 N.E.2d at 868.
199. Id. at 370-71, 538 N.E.2d at 869.
200. Id. The circuit court stated that by granting a motion to dismiss, the appellate
court would be able to consider expeditiously the public policy argument. Id. at 371, 528
N.E.2d at 869.
201. Id. at 369, 538 N.E.2d at 868.
202. Id. at 376-77, 538 N.E.2d at 873.
203. Id. at 373, 538 N.E.2d at 870-71.
204. Id. at 373-74, 538 N.E.2d at 870-71.
205. Id. at 373, 538 N.E.2d at 870-71. (citing Paterson v. City of Granite City, 78 Ill.
App. 3d 821, 397 N.E.2d 237 (5th Dist. 1979)). The court in Paterson stated that the
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Fund Act specifically prohibits supplemental pension benefits, the
court vacated the arbitrator's decision. 20 6 This case makes it clear
that although an arbitrator is bound to interpret only the terms of
the contract, the Illinois courts are not similarly bound and must
consider public policy issues as well. Therefore, if an arbitration
award appears to implicate a public policy issue, the courts are far
less likely to accord it traditional deference.2 °7
V. LEGISLATION
A. Higher Education
The Personnel File Act20 permits employees to inspect the con-
tents of their personnel files.2" To assist decisions regarding pro-
motions and tenure, institutions of higher education solicit
recommendations from persons, not employed by those institu-
tions, who are familiar with the employee's work. During the Sur-
vey year, the Personnel File Act was amended to exclude test
documents, letters of reference and external peer review documents
for academic employees of institutions of higher education.21 0
The legislature also amended the Illinois Human Rights Act 21
during the Survey period. The Act prohibits discrimination on the
basis of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, ancestry, age,
marital status, physical or mental handicap, or unfavorable dis-
charge form military service. Public Act 85-1229212 guarantees
freedom from sexual harassment in employment and in higher edu-
cation. In addition to prohibiting sexual harassment, the amend-
ments make it unlawful to aid or abet sexual harassment, or to
difference between a retired fire fighter's compensation and disability pension paid pursu-
ant to a municipal ordinance was a pension supplement and not continuing compensa-
tion. Paterson, 78 Ill. App. 3d at 824, 397 N.E.2d at 239.
206. 182 Ill. App. 3d at 372-73, 538 N.E.2d at 870.
207. In a famous series of cases called the "Steelworkers Trilogy," the Supreme
Court expressed a policy of deference toward arbitration as a preferred method of dispute
resolution. United Steelworkers of Am. v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960);
United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior and Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960);
United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enterprise Wheel and Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
208. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, paras. 2001-2012 (1987).
209. Id. para. 2002. See, Gecker and Albrecht, supra note 166, at 541-45 (for a dis-
cussion of recent amendments to the Personnel File Act).
210. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, para. 2010(a)(b) (Smith-Hurd 1989). Peer review docu-
ments may be revealed to other sources, however. In University of Pa. v. EEOC, 110 S.
Ct. 577 (1990), the Supreme Court held that a university had to make peer review docu-
ments available to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission so that it could in-
vestigate a charge of sex discrimination.
211. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 68, para. 7-102 (A)(1) (1985).
212. Codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 68, paras. 1-102, 6-101, 7-106 (1988).
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retaliate against any individual complaining of sexual harassment
under the Act.
B. Civil Rights
H.B. 3469213 requires public contractors to take affirmative ac-
tion to correct violations of the Illinois Human Rights Act within
sixty days after notification by the Illinois Department of Human
Rights. It is a civil rights violation for public contractors to fail to
comply with the Department's regulations concerning equal em-
ployment and affirmative action214 and to fail to provide any infor-
mation or assistance that the Department may request.215
A new statute, the Employee Rights Violation Act,21 6 requires
the immediate discharge of a policy-making employee when there
is a judgment rendered against the employee for violating another
employee's rights under the first and fourteenth amendments of the
federal Constitution, and when there has been a finding of willful
or wanton conduct or an award of punitive damages.
C. AIDS Testing
During the Survey year, the Communicable Disease Act,21 7 was
amended to allow persons to be tested for AIDS without their in-
formed consent if a physician believes they may have exposed a
health car provider, firefighter, or emergency medical technician to
the AIDS virus.218
D. Job Listing Services
The legislature created the Job Referral and Job Listing Services
Consumer Protection Act 219 during the Survey period in order to
provide protection to those seeking employment through fee-seek-
ing agencies. Before accepting a fee, a job referral service must
provide the job seeker with a written contract specifying the appli-
cant's qualifications and acceptable employment opportunities. 220
213. Codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 68, para. 2-105 (1988).
214. Id. para. 2-105 (1)-(4).
215. Id. para. 2-105 (3).
216. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 127, para. 63 (b)(100)(1) (1988).
217. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111, para. 22.12a (Smith-Hurd 1989).
218. Id. para. 7307.
219. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121, para. 2006 (1988).
220. Id. para. 2006 (1)-(2).
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E. Workers' Compensation
A new provision in the Workers' Compensation Act22 ' creates a
Self-Insurers Administration Fund and a Self-Insurers Advisory
Board to administer the Fund.2 2 The State Treasurer will be the
custodian of the Fund, and shall protect the fund with a general
bond. Upon the Fund Chairman's authorization, the State Comp-
troller will pay out of the Fund, only upon receipt of properly cer-
tified vouchers from the Workers' Compensation Commission.
VI. CONCLUSION
During the Survey year, the Illinois courts decided a number of
significant cases that will have an impact upon labor and employ-
ment law. In a case having national implications, the Illinois
Supreme Court ruled that federal law does not preempt state crimi-
nal prosecutions for violations of occupational safety and health
laws. Like many courts, including the United States Supreme
Court, Illinois courts had to determine the impact of public policy
on arbitration awards and the burden of proof that applies to em-
ployee discrimination claims. The courts continued to enlarge the
body of law interpreting the recently enacted public employee bar-
gaining laws. One court clarified the scope of mandatory bargain-
ing by endorsing a balancing test that limits a public employer's
obligation to bargain over matters concerning managerial policy.
Administrative agencies and the legislature addressed the timely
issues of discrimination, drug testing, and AIDS. Finally, even
though the public employee bargaining statutes contain provisions
safeguarding a public employer's right to control matters of mana-
gerial policy, the Illinois Supreme Court effectively rendered nuga-
tory union ability to organize non-judicial court employees.
221. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, para. 138.1 -.30 (1987).
222. Id. paras. 138.4(a) -(6.1).
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